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ABSTRACT  
Mortality improvement in many countries nowadays has drawn policymakers’ attention 
towards providing a ﬁnancially stable retirement scheme for retirees. In some countries like 
Chile and Switzerland, annuities are common and a successful product with a good retirement 
beneﬁt. Private annuities speciﬁcally designed for Employees Provident Fund members were 
also introduced in the Malaysian market in 2000. Despite the high annuitisation rate during 
that time, this product was suspended by the government a year after. Objections towards the 
scheme included a belief that insurance companies may proﬁt excessively from the scheme 
and it provided a lack of protection for contributors’ retirement savings. Annuities have been 
almost non-existent since then. In a recent Malaysian Government Budget an increase in tax 
relief for income used to purchase annuities seems to promote the development of annuity 
markets in Malaysia. Until now, there has been a lack of proper analysis in Malaysia to help 
buyers understand the value of annuities, especially upon retirement. This study aims to 
calculate the value for money of Malaysia’s private annuities by computing the Money’s 
Worth Ratio (MWR) and the Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW) of the annuity component of 
recent products. This analysis will be used to evaluate whether Malaysian private annuities are 
worth buying. 
Keywords: Malaysian annuity market; value for money; Money’s Worth Ratio; Annuity 
Equivalent Wealth; annuities  
 
ABSTRAK  
Jangka hayat yang semakin meningkat di kebanyakan negara kini telah menarik perhatian 
penggubal dasar untuk menyediakan skim kewangan persaraan yang stabil untuk pesara. Di 
beberapa negara seperti Chile dan Switzerland, anuiti adalah produk yang tidak asing dan 
memberi faedah persaraan yang baik. Anuiti persendirian yang diperkenal khusus untuk ahli 
Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja juga diperkenalkan di pasaran Malaysia pada tahun 2000. 
Walaupun kadar penyertaan anuiti pada ketika itu tinggi, produk ini ditangguhkan oleh 
kerajaan setahun selepas itu. Bantahan terhadap skim itu termasuk spekulasi bahawa syarikat 
insurans boleh mendapatkan keuntungan secara berlebihan daripada skim ini dan kurang 
melindungi simpanan persaraan pencarum. Sejak itu, anuiti hampir tidak wujud di pasaran 
insurans. Dalan Bajet Kerajaan Malaysia baru-baru ini, peningkatan pelepasan cukai untuk 
pendapatan yang digunakan bagi tujuan membeli anuiti dilihat sebagai usaha menggalakkan 
pembangunan pasaran anuiti di Malaysia. Sehingga kini, terdapat kekurangan analisis yang 
tepat di Malaysia untuk membantu pembeli memahami nilai anuiti, terutamanya ketika 
mencapai tahun persaraan. Kajian ini mengira nilai untuk wang produk anuiti persendirian di 
Malaysia dengan mengira Nisbah Nilai Wang dan Anuiti Bersamaan Harta bagi produk anuiti 
yang terkini. Analisis ini akan digunakan untuk menilai sama ada anuiti di Malaysia berfaedah 
untuk dibeli oleh pengguna.        
Kata kunci: pasaran anuiti Malaysia; nilai untuk wang; Nisbah Nilai Wang; Anuiti Bersamaan 
Harta; anuiti 
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1.  Introduction  
Since inception in 1951, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) as a government-guaranteed 
institution who manages the retirement fund of private sector employees in Malaysia has been 
providing reasonable returns to EPF members each year. The investment returns of the EPF 
average between 4% to 8% per annum over the past 50 years (EPF 2010). On the other hand, 
the decumulation phase also requires attention: the risk of outliving ones assets amongst EPF 
members needs to be managed. This risk is even greater considering the lump sum withdrawal 
option given to members upon attaining retirement age. According to Thillainathan (2004), 
there may be a shortage of members’ retirement savings since members are allowed to 
withdraw up to 40% of their savings pre-retirement to ﬁnance housing, education and health 
needs1.  
     In the year 2000, a group of private insurance companies named the ‘Konsortium Annuiti 
Malaysia’ introduced the EPF Annuity Schemes in an effort to provide a better decumulation 
scheme for members. Through this scheme, members were allowed to withdraw savings from 
their EPF account for the purpose of buying an annuity product. The introduction of this 
scheme has been a controversial issue since it received negative feedback from several 
entities, including a Malaysian workers’ representative body known as the Malaysian Trade 
Union Congress (MTUC). It was suspected of being an excessively proﬁtable scheme for 
insurers as it was managed by private insurance companies and not government. Members 
were exposed to uncertain investment returns and the risk of losing all of their savings if the 
insurers failed. The scheme could have been more popular if it had been provided by a 
government funded body or, perhaps, the EPF itself. As a result, this scheme was suspended 
by government at the end of 2001. Surprisingly, the participation to this scheme was 
tremendous with total single premium income of over RM4 billion collected from over 
200000 EPF members as at the date that the scheme was suspended (Mohd Kassim 2003). 
The discontinuation of the EPF Annuity Schemes has been a huge loss to the insurance 
industry with a drop of 48.2% in the single premium business — in contrast to the previous 
years’ remarkable growth of 171.7% in 2000 and 131.5% in 2001 (Aziz 2002). 
    The annuity market since almost shut down with only policyholders who opt to stay in the 
scheme making up the small number of annuitants in Malaysia. Furthermore, the Central 
Bank of Malaysia as a ﬁnancial industry regulator is very strict with the approval of annuity 
business, which must comply with the high capital requirement following the introduction of 
the Risk Based Capital requirement in 2007. Recently, the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
announced an increase in the tax concession on income used to purchase an annuity (in the 
Malaysian Government Budget of 2012). This incentive seems to promote the development of 
the annuity market following the approval of the New Annuity Plan (a new private annuity 
product) few months after the announcement was made. Despite that, due to the controversy 
surrounding annuities in 2000, it is uncertain whether this new product will receive a positive 
response from customers.  
    The main objective of this paper is to provide the value for money analysis of private 
annuities in Malaysia. Till present, few papers have been written on Malaysia’s private 
annuities. It is the aim of this paper to ﬁll that gap. The structure of this paper is as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the annuity experience of Malaysia, lessons learned from the annuity 
suspension in 2001 and the future of annuity provision in Malaysia. Methods and models used 
for annuity value for money analysis, namely the Money’s Worth Ratio (MWR) and Annuity 
Equivalent Wealth (AEW) are explained in Section 3. Lastly, section 4 contains the results of 
our analysis and section 5 concludes.  




2. The Annuity Experience in Malaysia  
In 2000, EPF members were allowed to withdraw their savings for the purpose of purchasing 
an annuity product. This scheme known as the EPF Annuity Schemes comprising the EPF 
Conventional Annuity Scheme (SAKK) and the EPF Islamic Annuity Scheme (SATK). In 
this paper, we focus on SAKK as details about the product features and data on annuity prices 
for SATK have eluded us. The annuity product provided under the SAKK scheme was a type 
of participating single premium annuity which commenced payment upon retirement at 55. It 
was provided by a consortium of private insurance companies called the ‘Konsortium Anuiti 
Malaysia’. For each unit purchased under this scheme, the beneﬁts are described by Mohd 
Kassim (2003) as follows:  
 
 A single life annuity of MYR1200 per year at purchase date plus bonus in addition to the  
base annuity projected at 2% per annum compound during the deferred period and 
continuing after annuity payment starts at 55. 
 Annuity payment is guaranteed for ten years after the commencement of payment. 
 A ten year annuity certain as a death beneﬁt prior to the vesting age of 55. 
 A Total and Permanent Disability (TPD) beneﬁt prior to retirement of an immediate 
annuity for a minimum of ten years commencing from the date of disablement. 
 
The single premium contribution rates of the EPF Annuity Scheme can be found in Table 1. 
The introduction of this scheme into the market was controversial with negative feedback 
from several entities, including a Malaysian workers representative body known as the 
Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC). According to Mohd Kassim (2003), objections 
made towards this scheme were due to three reasons. First, it was a scheme managed by 
private insurers and thus suspected of generating excessive proﬁts for insurers. Second, 
members were not protected from investment risk and could lose their savings. Third, there 
were instances of product misselling by insurance agents.  
    At the end of 2001 this scheme was suspended by government due to these objections. 
Policyholders were given the option to opt out of the scheme and receive a refund of the 
premium paid. There was a suggestion from the MTUC that the annuity scheme be managed 
by the EPF instead of private insurers so that policyholders would be more protected. A 
decision on the reintroducing this annuity scheme has been postponed until further study are 
made by the EPF - even though the demand for this annuity option was high. Interestingly, at 
the date the scheme was suspended the total business included 273392 policies with total 
single premium income of RM5.1 billion (Tunku Abdullah 2002). 
 
Table 1:  Premium Contribution Rates for the EPF Annuity Scheme (SAKK) 
Entry Age Premium Rates (MYR) 
 Male Female 
   
    35 7087 7867 
    45  11454 12731 
    55 19152 21288 
    65 16217 18025 
   
Source: Mohd Kassim (2003) 
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    Since this suspension in 2001, efforts have been made by insurers to reinvigorate the 
annuity market. The Central Bank of Malaysia is, however, being very strict with product 
approval. Moreover, with the Risk Based Capital requirement introduced in 2007, annuities 
have become more expensive to offer in the market. The recent announcement of an increased 
tax concession on income used to purchase an annuity of up to MYR3000 per annum the 
Malaysian Government Budget 2012 led to the introduction of a new private annuity plan into 
the market in the same year (Yee 2012). This private annuity product which we refer to in our 
paper as the New Annuity Plan, provides the following beneﬁts:  
• guaranteed yearly annuity income for 10 years or 15 years depending on choice of 
retirement age of buyers (either at age 55 or age 60). This is a non-participating deferred term 
annuity plan where beneﬁt of annuity income is only payable for term period of 10 or 15 
years upon the survival of the annuitants to age 55 or age 60.  
• payment of a policy cash value for unfortunate events such as death, total and permanent 
disability or diagnosis of critical illness (Angioplasty or other invasive treatments for Major 
Coronary Artery Disease are not covered). These beneﬁts are payable both prior to and after 
the vesting age of annuity payment.  
          
    The New Annuity Plan may prove popular. It is a tax-sheltered vehicle for harnessing after 
tax savings to provide retirement income and complements existing EPF savings. Moreover, 
the Malaysian government has also proposed removing an 8% investment income tax on 
deferred annuity funds. However, the New Annuity Plan faces competition from the Private 
Retirement Scheme (PRS) — launched in July 2012. PRS is a voluntary long-term investment 
scheme managed by a non-proﬁt organisation, set up by the government, and known as the 
Private Pension Administrator (Securities Commission Malaysia 2013). The scheme, also 
funded by after tax savings, serves as a complementary voluntary scheme to provide extra 
retirement income on top of the mandatory EPF savings. Compared to an annuity, PRS has a 
different framework where investors can choose to invest from a list of selected investment 
products approved by a regulatory body, the Securities Commission Malaysia. Similarly, this 
scheme is also entitled to personal tax income relief of up to MYR3000 per annum. Note that 
the tax income relief for both schemes is only effective for ten years. 
    The PRS may be more suitable for people who prefer to manage their own retirement 
funds, having freedom of access to a palette of investment funds. For customers who are 
looking for guaranteed income without having to worry about investment allocation, the New 
Annuity Plan may be preferable. In any case, both offer more retirement choices for 
Malaysians. This is supported by the Life Insurance Association Malaysia who believes that 
the government’s proposal for tax relief on the New Annuity Plan and the PRS is a major 
boost in retirement planning options (Singh 2012). 
3. Methodology  
We consider two valuation methods to evaluate the value for money of private annuities in 
Malaysia. This section explains the concepts underlying each method together with the basic 











3.1 Money’s Worth Ratio 
 
Our analysis of the value for money of annuities begins with the construction of the Expected 
Present Discounted Value (EPDV) formulation of the annuity product. The EPDV will be 
used to assess the money’s worth of the annuity schemes in relation to the initial purchase 
price, or premium, of an annuity product. This approach is called the Money’s Worth Ratio, 
commonly used by economists around the world for the purpose of valuing annuities. James 
and Vittas (2000) use the Money’s Worth Ratio to analyse the annuity markets in several 
countries, namely Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Singapore, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Also, Mitchell et al. (1999) use a Money’s Worth Ratio computation to value 
individual life annuities in the United States. The concept of money’s worth was introduced in 
Mitchell et al. (1999) with a term called the expected present discounted value per dollar 
annuity premium. In a later paper by Knox (2000) the same concept was used, but with a 
different term called the Money’s Worth Ratio and the ratio is then expressed as a percentage. 
The Money’s Worth Ratio provides useful information for both annuity providers and 
customers to differentiate between ranges of annuity products. As described by Mitchell 
(2001), the Money’s Worth Ratio represents a currency independent metric for comparing 
annuity products anytime and anywhere in the world. There are three important components 
in the EPDV formulation of an annuity product: the amount of annuity payments, mortality 
rates and interest rates used as discounting factors. The basic formula for computing the 
Money’s Worth Ratio (MWR) for an annuity product is as follows.  
 
         (1) 
where 
EPDV ≡ the Expected Present Discounted Value of an annuity product  
P ≡ the market premium of an annuity product  
 
The EPDV depends on the structure of the annuity product. Based on the structure of the EPF 
Annuity Scheme and the New Annuity Plan, the EPDV has three components of beneﬁt, 
namely the annuity element (both term-certain and life annuity), the death beneﬁt and the 
additional beneﬁts (consist of beneﬁt payable in the event of total and permanent disability 
and critical illness). Since the calculation of death beneﬁt and additional beneﬁts in the value 
for money analysis requires further extensive data (in particular, the cash value information 
and the total and permanent disability and critical illness rates), we value only the annuity 
element for both products. Thus, the analysis in this paper shows the value for money of only 
the annuity element of annuities in Malaysia. We develop the EPDV formulation for the EPF 
Annuity Scheme as follows - and then apply the same method to derive the EPDV of the New 
Annuity Plan: 
 
    (2) 
where  
Vx(A) ≡ the expected present discounted value of a life annuity paying A yearly, 
purchased by a person aged x. The limiting age is 100.  
Aj ≡ the yearly beneﬁt of a life annuity  
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Px ≡ the probability of a person aged x survives to age x+ j  
ik ≡ the nominal short-term interest rates during the kth period  
 
Based on the MWR formulation, an actuarially fair annuity premium will generate an MWR 
value of one (Fong et al. 2011). However, in practice, insurers have to include loadings which 
lead to higher premium charges. These transaction costs cover marketing costs, management 
costs, insurer’s reserves and proﬁts as well as adverse selection costs (Mitchell et al. 1999). 
The adverse selection cost is taken as the difference between the MWR value calculated using 
annuitant mortality rates and the MWR value calculated using the population mortality rates, 
which then expressed as a percentage, as in Fong (2011). 
 
3.2  Annuity Equivalent Wealth 
 
The “Equivalent Wealth Valuation”, described by Mitchell (2001), is another way of valuing 
annuity products. It takes into account the insurance value of an annuity product to the 
consumer which has been neglected in the previous valuation method. Here, the insurance 
value of annuities can be interpreted as the protection against longevity risk by providing 
annuitants with a stream of income for as long as they survive. Given an annuity as an option 
to decumulate retirement wealth, EPF members would be interested in knowing how much he 
or she should rationally forgo to receive this insurance value. The Annuity Equivalent Wealth 
(AEW) computation addresses this issue.   
    The concept of Annuity Equivalent Wealth was used by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) to 
compare the expected utility difference between a consumer with and without access to a 
perfect annuity market. This method then applied to the individual optimal consumption 
decision problem by Mitchell et al. (1999) using multi-period additively separable utility 
functions. One advantage of using this method is that it manages to capture differences risk 
aversion levels amongst consumers. Generally, ones level of risk aversion affects consumer 
utility impacting on a consumer’s decision to annuitise. For instance, a risk averse consumer 
will value annuities higher than the value computed using the simple ﬁnancial of money’s 
worth approach (Mitchell 2001). Roughly, the AEW measures the ratio of the value of non-
annutised assets to the value of annuitised assets producing equivalent utility. Precise details 
of the AEW are given below. 
    Consider a representative individual who is assumed to maximise his expected utility 
function by following an optimal consumption path, Ct. We denote his expected utility 
function as a value function, V. 
 
       (3) 
where 
Ct ≡ the optimal consumption at time t  
U(Ct) ≡ the utility function for a consumption of Ct  
tPx ≡ the probability that a person aged x survives to age x+t  
T ≡ the maximum possible lifespan x ≡ the person’s age at the time of purchase  
y ≡ the person’s age when the annuity payment commences  
            ρ≡ the rate of time preference  
 




The budget constraint for this individual depends on two conditions, ﬁrst, in the presence of 
an annuity market, and second, in the absence of an annuity market. Thus, given initial wealth 
of W0, and a nominal interest rate (combining a real interest rate of r and an inﬂation rate of 
π), the budget constraint is derived below.  
 
First condition: with an annuity the budget constraint is as follows.  
 
          (4) 
         (5) 
      (6) 
Second condition: without an annuity the budget constraint is as follows. 
 
         (7) 
          (8) 
      (9) 
In the ﬁrst condition, the initial wealth after annuitisation is set to be 0 as the consumer 
consumed all of his initial wealth to purchase annuity with a premium P and in return, 
receiving At of yearly annuity income. We follow the method in Brown (2003) to determine P 
as follows. 
 
       (10) 
Given a yearly annuity income of At, we can determine an actuarially fair price P of an 
annuity using the above formula. We can also ﬁnd the market price P’ of an annuity which 
typically allows for loadings, — by multiplying the right hand side of Eq. (10) by (1+l) where 
l is the load factor. From the optimisation problem of Eq. (3), we ﬁnd the optimal 
consumption path for the individual under the ﬁrst condition. Then, we evaluate the expected 
utility level, V, associated with that consumption path. Next, we move to the second condition 
and again solve the optimization problem—but this time solve it by Ct by ﬁnding the initial 
wealth level  w such that the individual has the same level of expected utility V, making him 
as well off as if he had access to an annuity market.  
    As in most literature for the AEW analysis, we assume that this individual has a utility 
function of U(Ct) of form: 
 
        (11) 
where γ is the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and 1/γ is the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution in consumption. Lastly, we compute the ratio required in terms of 
the initial wealth level for this individual to achieve the same expected utility under 
bothconditions. Here, α is Annuity Equivalent Wealth. It is expressed in terms of ratio of the 
non-annuitised wealth over the annuitised wealth: 
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  (12) 
 
For illustration, let us consider an individual who consumed $5000 to purchase an annuity (P) 
in order to achieve his maximum expected utility (V). An I value of 1.5 indicates that he 
would require 150% of his annuitised wealth or $7500 of non-annuitised wealth to obtain the 
same expected utility, V. In this paper, we use the AEW computation to measure whether 
there is a utility gain if someone makes a purchase under the EPF Annuity Scheme or the 
New Annuity Plan. 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 The Money’s Worth Ratio Results 
 
As described in Section 3, our analysis consists of interpreting value for money metrics for 
annuities using two valuation methods, namely the Money’s Worth Ratio (MWR) and the 
Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW). The analysis of the EPF Annuity Scheme, which was 
introduced in 2000, is divided into three categories. The product was a participating annuity 
scheme with a projected 2% compounded bonus per annum prior and after the 
commencement of annuity payment. However, there is no guarantee that the insurers will 
always pay the full amount of the bonus every year. Consideration has to be taken for the 
possibility of no bonus at all or a bonus of less than 2% per annum. Thus, we provide the 
MWR and the AEW values for three possibilities: without bonus, with 1% compounded 
bonus per annum and with 2% compounded bonus per annum.  
    Table 2 presents the results for the MWR analysis of the annuity element of the EPF 
Annuity Scheme (SAKK). In addition, we calculate the adverse selection cost of the product 
by computing the (percentage) difference between the MWR value obtained from the 
annuitant mortality table and its population mortality table equivalent, as in Fong (2011). 
Comparing results from Table 2 for ‘without bonus’ to ‘with 1% or with 2% bonus’ we can 
see that the MWR value are consistently increasing as the bonus payout increases from none 
to its full bonus amount of 2% per annum for all entry ages. This is expected, given the same 
annuity market prices P as in Table1 (the MWR denominators), but higher annuity payouts 
(the MWR numerators). Each MWR value calculated using two term structure of interest 
rates. The MGS represents the Malaysian Government Securities risk-free interest rates and 
the CB represents the AAA Corporate Bond which gives the term structure of (risky) bond 
rates. The higher yield rates for corporate bonds produces lower values for the MWR of the 
EPF Annuity Scheme, especially when no bonus is paid and the entry age is below 55. On the 
other hand, if the insurer pays full bonus, the MWR values obtained under the MGS term 
structure of interest rates are reasonably high, with some values even exceeding unity — 
which indicates the customer is paying less than the actuarially fair price of the product. 
 The adverse selection costs of the product ranges from 4 to 30 percent. Similarly, these 
costs increase as the bonus payout increases, showing that the product favours the group of 
annuitants with high survival probabilities most when the full bonus amount is paid by 
insurers. Our results for the adverse selection costs of the EPF Annuity Scheme are quite 
consistent with the previous literature, which is on average, around 10 to 15 percentage points 
in Mitchell et al. (1999). However, the cost can be quite high when bonus payments are 
included.  
 




    Table 2:  Money’s Worth Ratio and Adverse Selection (AS) Costs of the EPF Annuity Scheme 
Entry Age Male Female 
Without 
compounded bonus 
Population Annuitant AS (%) Population Annuitant AS (%) 
  MGS       
    35 0.646 0.719 7.3 0.655 0.803 14.8 
    45  0.702 0.778 7.6 0.711 0.865 15.4 
    55 0.747 0.819 7.2 0.755 0.907 15.2 
    65 0.741 0.822 8.1 0.747 0.956 20.9 
   CB       
    35 0.374 0.408 3.4 0.379 0.442 6.3 
    45 0.490 0.532 4.2 0.495 0.575 8.0 
    55 0.648 0.699 5.1 0.633 0.727 9.4 
    65 0.644 0.723 7.9 0.648 0.790 14.2 
Bonus 1% Population Annuitant AS (%) Population Annuitant AS (%) 
  MGS       
    35 0.861 0.972 11.1 0.874 1.105 23.1 
    45  0.848 0.952 10.4 0.860 1.078 21.8 
    55 0.818 0.908 9.0 0.828 1.024 19.6 
    65 0.794 0.892 9.8 0.801 1.056 25.5 
   CB       
    35 0.494 0.544 7.3 0.500 0.598 9.8 
    45 0.586 0.642 7.7 0.593 0.705 11.2 
    55 0.704 0.767 6.7 0.686 0.806 12.0 
    65 0.686 0.778 8.8 0.691 0.863 17.2 
Bonus 2% Population Annuitant AS (%) Population Annuitant AS (%) 
  MGS       
    35 1.150 1.319 16.9 1.171 1.533 36.2 
    45  1.028 1.171 14.3 1.044 1.355 31.1 
    55 0.901 1.014 11.1 0.912 1.166 25.4 
    65 0.853 0.970 11.7 0.861 1.174 31.3 
   CB       
    35 0.653 0.728 10.6 0.663 0.814 15.1 
    45 0.703 0.780 10.3 0.712 0.869 15.7 
    55 0.768 0.846 8.3 0.748 0.901 15.3 
    65 0.732 0.841 10.4 0.738 0.948 19.0 
 
    Next, Table 3 presents the MWR values and the adverse selection cost of the New Annuity 
Plan which was introduced in 2012. In contrast to results from the EPF Annuity Scheme, the 
MWR values for female are always higher than male here because we only use one standard 
annuity price for both genders - the annuity provider charges the same market premium for 
both genders. Thus, the lower mortality rates of female group gives a higher value of MWR 
for all entry ages. Besides, the MWR values also slightly higher for payment term 2 compared 
to payment term 1 since beneﬁt payment is higher when the payment term is longer. Notice 
that the difference of MWR values under the MGS term structure and the CB term structure 
for the NewAnnuity Plan is not as much as in the previous result which supports by the 
smaller spread of difference between the government bond and the corporate bond interest 
rates in 2012 as compared to year 2000. Overall, the MWR values of the New Annuity Plan 
are less than unity for all entry ages, both payment terms and both options A and B. The high 
capital requirement by the Central Bank of Malaysia for annuity business provider might be 
the reason for lower than unity MWR values. Appropriate loading factors have to be 
accounted for when pricing such annuities to ensure the sustainability of the product in the 
market.  
    For the EPF Annuity Scheme, with the exception of without bonus MWR values, our result 
is quite consistent with the MWR values of US annuities (Mitchell et al. 1999) under the 
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government bond term structure of interest rates but lower under the corporate bond term 
structure of interest rates. For the New Annuity Plan, international comparison is hardly 
available as most previous literature produce results of MWR values for entry ages of 55 and 
above. However, if we ignore the entry age and compare the MWR values of the New 
Annuity Plan with the MWR values of annuities around the world, they are slightly lower. 
Most MWR values in other countries ranges from 0.8 to 1.1. Eventhough the value for money 
of the New Annuity Plan is quite low, the adverse selection effect for the product is very 
small and consistent with results in Fong (2011) for Singapore annuities.  
In considering all the foregoing MWR values an important caveat needs to be drawn to the 
reader’s attention. The MWR analysis in this paper only calculates the dollar value of the 
annuity element in the numerator — it uses the market premium in the denominator. Since 
these products also provide other non-annuity beneﬁts (like death beneﬁt, a total and 
permanent disability or a critical illness beneﬁt) the MWR values are not precise, and are 
lower than the true MWR values. That is, the denominator values are overstated from this 
pure annuity values; they include other insurance values. For the EPF Annuity Scheme values 
the degree of understatement will be small (as the expected values of the additional beneﬁts is 
quite small relative to the annuity values); for the New Annuity Plan the degree of 
understatement will be larger (as the expected value of additional beneﬁts is larger relative to 
the annuity values). This calls for deeper research into the (complex) nature of the additional 
beneﬁts. The AEW values, however, do not suffer from this bias, and it is to their analysis we 
now turn. 
 
Table 3:  Money’s Worth Ratio and Adverse Selection (AS) Costs of the New Annuity Plan 
Entry Age  Male                               Female 
Option A 
Retirement 
age at 55 
Population Annuitant AS(%) Population 
 
Annuitant       AS (%) 
Payment 
term 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
  MGS             
    35 0.727 0.759 0.779 0.805 5.3 4.6 0.793 0.819 0.835 0.858 4.2 3.9 
    45  0.773 0.777 0.815 0.818 4.2 4.1 0.822 0.826 0.862 0.865 3.9 3.9 
   CB             
    35 0.596 0.645 0.639 0.684 4.3 3.9 0.650 0.696 0.684 0.729 3.4 3.3 
    45 0.693 0.699 0.730 0.735 3.7 3.6 0.736 0.742 0.771 0.776 3.5 3.4 
Option B 
Retirement 
age at 60 
Population Annuitant AS(%) Population Annuitant       AS (%) 
Payment 
term 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
  MGS             
    35 0.710 0.752 0.773 0.805 6.2 5.3 0.791 0.825 0.846 0.875 5.5 5.0 
    45  0.728 0.754 0.780 0.801 5.2 4.7 0.790 0.812 0.843 0.861 5.2 4.8 
   CB             
    35 0.494 0.632 0.617 0.676 4.9 4.5 0.632 0.693 0.676 0.735 4.3 4.2 
    45 0.586 0.671 0.680 0.713 4.5 4.2 0.689 0.722 0.734 0.765 4.5 4.3 
             
 
 
     
 
 






4.2 The Annuity Equivalent Wealth Results 
 
The analyses of theAnnuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW) in the previous literature assume a 
ﬁxed real interest rate and inﬂation rate over time. For instance, Brown (2003) and Fong 
(2011) used a real interest rate and inﬂation rate of 3%, where r = π = 3%. In our analysis, as 
we do not have the real interest rates information, we assume to follow the term structure of 
interest rate that reﬂects the Malaysian data rather than assuming a ﬁxed rate. According to 
the Eq.(10), the total discounted factor in the formulation is the nominal rate of interest so we 
decide to choose the average nominal risk-free interest rate used in the MWR analysis. We 
follow their assumption of the rate of time preference, ρ = 3%.  
    Table 5 shows the AEW values of the EPF Annuity Scheme (SAKK) for all three 
possibilities of without bonus, with 1% bonus and with 2% bonus respectively. While Table 6  
presents the AEW values of the New Annuity Plan for both option A and B. For comparison 
purpose,we choose two different level of risk aversion of γ = 1.5 and γ = 3. Since prior studies 
on consumption such as Laibson et al. (1998), and Brandt and Wang (2003) found that the 
average risk aversion level parameter is between 1 to 2, the γ values that we choose seem 
reasonable. The AEW values presented here are calculated based on the actuarially fair 
annuity price as in most studies.  
    First, we ﬁnd that by increasing the risk aversion level from 1.5 to 3, the AEW values for 
all categories of the New Annuity Plan (Table 5) increase by a small amount as the consumer 
generally values annuity more if he has a high risk aversion level. This is not the case for the 
EPF Annuity Scheme as this annuity product offers an increase bonus payment on top of the 
basic annuity income, thus a more risk averse consumer may value it lower as he prefers a 
smooth consumption pattern. Another factor that affects the consumer behaviour here is the 
higher risk-free interest rate in year 2000 (the average risk-free interest rate is 5.7% in 2000 
and 3.5% in 2012). Given a higher rate of interest, a more risk averse consumer would be less 
willing to forgo current consumption for future consumption, thus value annuity lower than a 
less risk averse consumer. Only for some category of entry age 65, the AEW is higher for a 
more risk averse individual (refer to Table 4). However, the difference of AEW value 
calculated using a risk aversion level of 1.5 and of 3, are not signiﬁcant for all categories. For 
the New Annuity Plan, the difference in AEW is very small which resulted in equal value up 
to 3 decimal points if the annuity premium is charged using the actuarially fair price 
regardless of payment term 1 or 2.  
 Overall, based on actuarially fair price annuity, our AEW result is consistent with prior 
studies where both the EPF Annuity Scheme and the New Annuity Plan provide a good value 
for money for consumers. All values of AEW are greater than 1 which shows that a consumer 
without access to annuity would need higher initial wealth amount to achieve the same 
expected utility level as if he had access to annuity by [AEW(α)−1](100)%. Our result is 
consistent with previous studies where given an actuarially fair annuity product, consumer 
would always ﬁnd full annuitisation as an optimal consumption strategy. 
5. Conclusion 
Annuities are less popular in Malaysia compared to other insurance products; the annuity 
market is very small and almost non-existent in the past several years. Annuitisation rates 
were quite high in 2000, following the introduction of the EPF Annuity market which allows 
EPF members to withdraw their EPF savings for the purpose of purchasing annuities. Since 
the EPF Annuity was not a government funded or backed up scheme, this product was 
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controversial due to the perceived lack of protection of members’ retirement savings and 
uncertain investment returns. Objections by several entities, including a Malaysian workers 
representative body, to the scheme lead to the suspension of the EPF Annuity Scheme at the 
end of 2001. Since then, the percentage of new business premiums for annuities has been 
almost 0% of total new business premiums in the insurance market (Aziz 2011).  
Table 4:  Annuity Equivalent Wealth of the EPF Annuity Scheme 
Entry Age Male Female 
Without 
compounded bonus 
    
Gamma 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 
35 1.299 1.294 1.152 1.142 
45 1.298 1.294 1.166 1.157 
55 1.288 1.281 1.172 1.163 
65 1.456 1.476 1.285 1.284 
     
Bonus 1%     
Gamma 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 
35 1.294 1.293 1.147 1.142 
45 1.298 1.293 1.161 1.157 
55 1.288 1.287 1.168 1.162 
65 1.456 1.476 1.282 1.284 
     
Bonus 2%     
Gamma 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 
35 1.298 1.274 1.151 1.120 
45 1.298 1.277 1.165 1.133 
55 1.287 1.269 1.172 1.143 
65 1.456 1.464 1.285 1.270 
     
 
Table 5:  Annuity Equivalent Wealth of the New Annuity Plan 
Entry Age Male Female 
Option A     
Gamma 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 
Payment term 1     
35 1.307 1.333 1.201 1.225 
45 1.328 1.356 1.258 1.274 
Payment term 2     
35 1.307 1.333 1.201 1.225 
45 1.328 1.356 1.258 1.274 
     
Option B     
Gamma 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 
Payment term 1     
35 1.400 1.433 1.259 1.289 
45 1.435 1.470 1.335 1.356 
Payment term 2     
35 1.400 1.433 1.259 1.289 
45 1.435 1.470 1.335 1.356 
     










    Inspite of the high liabilities associated with issuing annuities, they have the attractive 
feature of providing a secure stream of income for retirees. Thus, governments in several 
countries still promote annuities as one of the options for retirement income. Singapore’s CPF 
Annuity is the best example of a recent government annuity scheme. It is noteworthy that the 
price of this annuity really favours buyers. According to Fong (2011), the Singapore CPF 
Annuity has been designed as a government funded scheme which helps cost saving through 
economies of scale as retirees tend to choose risk-free retirement funds over riskier products 
offered by private insurers.  
The recent Malaysian government budget of 2012 also supports annuity growth in 
Malaysia by increasing the tax exemption on income used to purchase annuities. Following 
that budget announcement, a new annuity plan has been introduced in the market for 
consumers to enjoy the tax exemption beneﬁts announced by the Malaysian government. The 
recent controversial history of annuities in Malaysia suggests consumers may be wary.  
    This paper provides deeper understanding of annuities in Malaysia for consumers by 
computing the value for money of the annuity element of Malaysia’s private annuities using 
two valuation methods, the Money’s Worth Ratios (MWR) and the Annuity Equivalent 
Wealth (AEW). Assuming a risk-free term structure of interest rates, we found that the 
suspended EPF Annuity Scheme provides good value for money to consumers when a bonus 
is included in the annuity beneﬁt.     
    The suspension of annuities in 2000 has had a great impact on the development of the 
annuity market in Malaysia. Current stringent regulations require any new annuity product 
offered in Malaysia to undergo an approval process directed by the Central Bank of Malaysia. 
Generally, our ﬁndings indicate that the New Annuity Plan introduced in 2012 has slightly 
lower value for money compared to the values of annuities around the world and the previous 
EPF Annuity Scheme. This suggests that stricter capital requirements have resulted in more 
expensive annuities. Furthermore, since the New Annuity Plan was designed as a retirement 
security product to provide guaranteed annuity income, the insurer would have to charge 
higher loadings compared to other non-guaranteed insurance products.  
    Lastly, it is important to point out again that our analysis only treats the annuity element of 
the product; it does not include the additional beneﬁts provided under both the EPF Annuity 
Scheme and the New Annuity Plan. Thus, the value for money analysis is only correct for the 
annuity element of the product. Our calculated metrics ignore the value contribution of 
additional beneﬁts such as death, total permanent disability and critical illness insurance. 
Furthermore, our analysis in this paper does not incorporate the tax incentives proposed by 
the Malaysian government. More extensive analysis requires more data and information on 
the transition probabilities for different health states incorporated in an extended model we 
shall pursue in future research. More importantly, the future challenges should be considered 
in developing annuity product not only on conventional basis but also takaful industry in the 
Malaysian insurance market such as discussed by Mohd Kassim (2015) and Soualhi (2017). 
The future of takaful based retirement product is more challenging  due to the downsizing of 
the Shariah complied investment vehicles and the shortage of long term investment products 
(Soualhi 2017). This is an important element in managing the cashflows and to ensure the 
solvency of insurers who offers such annuity products.   
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